For two years now, they have been repeating the same line. Gas no longer costs what it did in 2022, so bills should be back to “normal.” And yet, when winter comes, many Italian households still find themselves paying noticeably more than they did before the crisis.
That is the point that often gets oversimplified, especially in political debate: asking “how much do the sanctions cost?” is legitimate, but an energy bill is not a thermometer that measures one single cause. It reflects the price of the commodity, of course, but also transport, system charges, taxes, fixed components, and, above all, the fact that many of the emergency measures from the worst years are no longer in place.
Let’s start with the most tangible numbers, the ones that matter to people who actually have to pay.
According to estimates by the think tank ECCO, in 2025–2026 an Italian family will spend on average about 40% more on gas than in 2019–2020, even if less than the previous winter, which is described as the most expensive on record. In plain terms: the curve has come down from its peaks, but it has not returned to where it was before the crisis.
Take a very common case: a 70-square-metre apartment with a low energy rating, using gas for heating, cooking, and hot water between November and March. In Milan, estimated spending reaches €1,079 compared to €825 in 2019–2020, roughly €254 more. In Rome it rises to €1,007 compared to €706, or €301 more. In Palermo it is €677 versus €466, meaning €211 more. And as the home gets larger, the gap widens: for 110-square-metre homes, seasonal costs easily exceed €1,400–€1,600 in cities across central and northern Italy.
The question, however, is always the same: if wholesale gas prices today are no longer through the roof, why doesn’t the bill “breathe” in the same way?
Because the commodity itself is only part of the story. Even with a gas price assumed to be around €30 per MWh, far below the 2022 spikes, other items do not disappear: transport, system charges, fixed fees, and taxation. And there is another factor that often gets brushed aside: during the toughest phase, the state cushioned the blow with extraordinary and very costly interventions. In 2022, measures against soaring energy prices had an overall impact estimated in the tens of billions. When these “parachutes” are reduced or end, a drop in wholesale prices does not automatically translate into a proportional drop in household bills.
So where do sanctions come in?
They matter mainly as part of a structural shift: Europe has sharply reduced Russian gas and has replaced a growing share of supplies with LNG, liquefied natural gas shipped in from the United States and other providers. This shift is not neutral. LNG requires a longer and more expensive chain: liquefaction, transport, and regasification. Above all, it ties European prices to a more global market, where Europe competes with other buyers, first and foremost Asia. That does not necessarily mean prices are always high, but it almost always means greater volatility and a larger “risk premium” embedded in the price.
At the same time, the European Union has formalised a path to phase out imports of Russian gas, aiming to close that chapter gradually over the coming years, with LNG first and pipeline gas later. It is a political and strategic choice, not just an economic one. What you pay is not a single “sanctions tax,” but a new equilibrium: more diversified supplies, different infrastructure, and different logistics costs.
There is also a very Italian element that makes the discussion even more paradoxical. In theory, part of the answer lies in electrifying consumption, for instance through heat pumps. On paper, efficiency is higher and the numbers can change dramatically. ECCO estimates that, for heating and hot water, electricity could cut seasonal spending significantly: in Rome, for example, the gap would be particularly large. And here another local detail comes into play: in Lazio, a regional surcharge is applied to gas that does not exist elsewhere, pushing the comparison even further.
The problem is that, in the Italian system, those who try to “break away” from gas are often not fully rewarded. On electricity bills, taxes and levies still account for a substantial share, heavier than those applied to gas. The result is that, yes, electricity can be cheaper, but not as much as it could be. And when the switch requires an upfront investment of several thousand euros, families do not decide on theory; they decide on the real payback time and the risk of costs changing from one year to the next.
In the end, the most accurate answer to the question “how much more does gas cost because of sanctions?” is also the least comfortable one: there is no single number that isolates that share. What we can say, based on the data, is that compared to 2019–2020 many families still pay hundreds of euros more per season. And part of this “new normal” depends on how Europe sources its energy today, on the weight of taxes and charges, and on the end of extraordinary measures that had temporarily contained the crisis.
